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Abstract
We consider a constant returns to scale, one sector economy with
segmented asset markets of the Woodford (1986) type. We analyze
the role of public spending, financed by labor income and consump-
tion taxation, on the emergence of indeterminacy. We find that what
is relevant for indeterminacy is the variability of the distortion in-
troduced by government intervention. We further discuss the results
in terms of the level of the tax rate, its variability with respect to
the tax base and the degree of externalities in preferences due to the
existence of a public good. We show that the degree of public spend-
ing externalities aﬀects the combinations between the tax rate and its
variability under which indeterminacy occurs. Moreover, in contrast
to previous results, we find that consumption taxes can lead to local
indeterminacy when asset markets are segmented.
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1 Introduction
The eﬀects of government spending and taxes on income distribution, eco-
nomic growth and welfare have been thoroughly discussed in the literature.
More recently some papers have also stressed that fiscal policy may create
indeterminacy, and thereby have destabilizing eﬀects on the economy by trig-
gering cycles driven by self-fulfilling volatile expectations, i.e. sunspots. The
pioneer work of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) shows that, in a Ramsey
model with a pre-set level of government expenditures, when the labor in-
come tax is determined by a balanced budget rule, the economy can exhibit
an indeterminate steady state and a continuum of stationary sunspot equilib-
ria. Pintus (2003) and Gokan (2006), considering the same fiscal policy rule,
show that similar results are obtained in a segmented asset market economy
of the Woodford (1986) type.
In this paper we extend this analysis, studying the role of public spending
financed by labor income and consumption taxation on the emergence of
indeterminacy, within a segmented asset markets economy of the Woodford
(1986) type, for a wider class of fiscal policy rules.
It is well known that constant income tax rates can not be per se a
source of local indeterminacy in a Ramsey model.1 The same happens in a
segmented asset market economy as proved below. Therefore, we focus on
variable tax rates, i.e. tax rates that vary (negatively or positively) with
the tax base, while government spending adjusts in order to balance the
budget. The tax rate rule considered is characterized by two parameters:
the level of the tax rate and its variability with respect to the tax base.2
Our fiscal policy rule covers as particular cases the case of a constant flow
of public expenditures, as considered in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997),
Pintus (2003), Gokan (2006) and Giannitsarou (2007), and also the case of
a constant tax rate as in Guo and Harrison (2004).
For some time, economists have been arguing that public goods and in-
frastructures may influence the utility of consumption.3 More recently, this
idea has been exploited in works on indeterminacy and endogenous cycles.
1See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) and Guo and Harrison (2004).
2The functional form considered for the tax rate is similar to the one used by Guo and
Lansing (1998) in a Ramsey framework, although the tax bases are diﬀerent. Dromel and
Pintus (2004) also allow for tax rate variability but they restrict their analysis to the case
of weak progressivity.
3For a seminal contribution, see Barro (1981).
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See for example Seegmuller (2003) and Utaka (2003) in a overlapping gen-
erations framework and Cazzavillan (1996), Zhang (2000), Fernandez et al.
(2004) and Guo and Harrison (2006) in a Ramsey model.4 In this paper, we
also introduce the possibility of positive government spending externalities
in preferences. We assume that consumers derive utility from eﬀective con-
sumption, a composite good that combines private consumption and public
expenditures. More precisely, we consider that private consumption and gov-
ernment services are non-separable and Edgeworth complements, following
Ni (1995) who provides empirical support for these assumptions.5
A novel feature of our work is that we study how the degree of govern-
ment spending externalities aﬀects the combinations between the tax rate
and its variability under which indeterminacy occurs, in a Woodford (1986)
framework. For example, we find that in the absence of government spending
externalities, for a given elasticity of the labor tax rate with respect to the
tax base, a suﬃciently low tax rate ensures determinacy. However, this is
no longer true for higher values of public spending externalities. Also, with
constant labor income tax rates, indeterminacy becomes possible when pub-
lic spending externalities on preferences are suﬃciently strong. Therefore,
our results show that taking into account the degree of government spending
externalities is crucial in order to correctly evaluate the dynamic implications
of diﬀerent fiscal policy rules.
Another novel feature of our work is that we study the eﬀects of con-
sumption taxation on indeterminacy in a segmented asset markets economy.
Giannitsarou (2007), using a Ramsey model without public spending exter-
nalities, addressed only the case where a fixed stream of government spending
is financed by consumption taxes, and found that indeterminacy was not pos-
sible in this case. Here, we consider a more general fiscal policy rule that
encompasses the one analyzed in Giannitsarou (2007). We find that, in a seg-
mented asset markets framework, indeterminacy is possible with a consump-
tion tax rate that responds negatively to the tax base. In particular, in the
case of the fiscal policy rule analyzed in Giannitsarou (2007) indeterminacy
4Note, however, that in all these papers simpler fiscal policy rules are considered: a
constant tax rate and/or a constant stream of government expenditures.
5There is an ongoing debate in the literature discussing whether private consumption
and government services are Edgeworth complements or substitutes. However, the con-
clusions from this empirical literature are mixed, not providing a clear answer to this
question. See for example Karras (1994), Ni (1995), Evans and Karras (1996) and Amano
and Wirjanto (1998).
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may emerge in our framework, even without public spending externalities on
preferences. This shows that taxes have diﬀerent eﬀects on indeterminacy in
segmented asset markets and Ramsey models. Being aware of the markets
distortions (e.g. financial imperfections) existing in the pre-intervention sit-
uation is therefore also crucial to address correctly the dynamic implications
of fiscal policy rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
present the model used, that extends the Woodford (1986) framework to
allow for public spending, which may aﬀect preferences and is financed by
labor and consumption taxes. We obtain the perfect foresight equilibrium
and prove the existence and uniqueness of the steady state. In section 3, we
present and discuss in detail the indeterminacy results, providing an economic
intuition and a numerical example. Finally, in the last section, we make some
concluding remarks. Proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 The Model
The model used is an extension of theWoodford (1986) framework that allows
for public spending financed by taxation. We consider a perfectly competi-
tive monetary economy with discrete time t = 1, 2, ...,∞ and heterogeneous
infinite lived agents. Indeed, following Woodford (1986), we assume that
there are two types of agents, workers and capitalists. While workers and
capitalists consume both the final good, only workers supply labor. More-
over, there is a financial market imperfection that prevents workers from
borrowing against their wage income and workers are more impatient than
capitalists, i.e. they discount the future more than the latter. So, in a neigh-
borhood of a monetary steady state, capitalists hold the whole capital stock
and no money, whereas workers save their wage earnings through money bal-
ances. The final good is produced by firms under a Cobb-Douglas technology
characterized by constant returns to scale. Finally, we introduce government
policy in this framework, and assume that public spending, that may aﬀect
workers utility, is financed by labor and/or consumption taxes. The detailed
description of the model is provided below.
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2.1 The Production Sector
Both capital kt and labor lt are used to produce the final good, yt, under a
Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to scale:
yt = kst l1−st (1)
where s ∈ (0, 1) represents the capital share in total income. Producers
maximize their profits. Since all markets are perfectly competitive, we obtain
the following expressions for the real wage and the real interest rate:
ωt = (1− s)kst l−st ≡ ω(kt, lt) (2)
ρt = sks−1t l1−st ≡ ρ(kt, lt) (3)
2.2 The Government
The government chooses the tax policy and balances its budget at each period
in time. Therefore, real public spending in goods and services in period t,
Gt ≥ 0 is given by:
Gt = τ l (ωtlt)ωtlt + τ c (ct) ct (4)
where τ l (ωtlt) represents the labor tax rate determined as a function of
aggregate labor income in the economy. Also ct = cwt + cct , where cwt denotes
consumption of workers in period t, cct denotes consumption of capitalists
in period t and τ c (ct) represents the consumption tax rate determined as a
function of aggregate consumption. We assume that:
τ l (ωtlt) = αl
µ
ωtlt
ωl
¶φl
(5)
τ c (ct) = αc
³ct
c
´φc
(6)
where ωl is the steady state value of the wage bill, and c is the steady state
level of total consumption. The parameter 0 ≤ αl < 1 determines the level of
the tax rate on labor income at the steady state. Similarly αc ≥ 0 determines
the level of the consumption tax rate at the steady state. The parameters
φj ∈ R with j = l, c denote the elasticities of the tax rates with respect
to the tax bases. When φj < 0 the tax rate decreases when the tax base
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expands, φj > 0 corresponds to the cases where the tax rate increases with
the tax base, and for φj = 0 the tax rate is constant. The specification
considered for the fiscal policy rule given by (4), (5) and (6) nests most of
the cases considered in the literature. Indeed it nests the case considered in
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997), Pintus (2003) and Gokan (2006) where a
constant amount of public expenditures is financed by taxes on labor income,
so that τ l (ωtlt) = G/ωtlt. Hence we recover their specification when φl = −1,
αl = G/ωl and αc = 0. Moreover, we admit as a particular case Giannitsarou
(2007) for αl = 0, αc = G/c and φc = −1, which means that constant public
expenditures are only financed by consumption taxes.6
2.3 Workers
We assume a continuum of identical workers of mass one. Preferences of each
worker may be aﬀected by public expenditures and are represented by the
following utility function:
∞X
t=1
λt−1
·
U
µ
Gηt cwt
B
¶
− λV (lt)
¸
(7)
where lt is labor supply, cwt is his consumption, and λ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount
factor. Public spending externalities in preferences are given by Gη, where
η ≥ 0 represents the degree of these externalities,7 and we call Gηt cwt eﬀective
consumption. Moreover, we make the following assumptions on the utility
functions U and V :
Assumption 1 The functions U (x) and V (l) are continuous for all x ≥ 0
and 0 ≤ l ≤ el, where the labor endowment el > 0 may be finite or infinite.
They are Cn for x > 0, 0 < l < el and n large enough, with U 0(x) > 0,
U 00(x) ≤ 0, V 0(l) > 0 and V 00(l) ≥ 0. Moreover, liml→elV 0(l) = +∞ and
−xU 00(x)/U 0(x) < 1.
6Note that if we had considered more general tax rates functions, instead of assuming
an isoelastic specification as in (5) and (6), our indeterminacy results would not change,
provided αj and φj respectively denote the level of the tax rates and their elasticities with
respect to the tax base evaluated at the steady state.
7Note that if we had considered a more general multiplicative externality function, our
indeterminacy results would be identical, provided η denotes the elasticity of this function
evaluated at the steady state.
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Note that under Assumption 1, when η > 0, cwt and Gt are Edgeworth
complements (∂
2U(x)
∂cw∂G > 0).8
In the following mwt+1 and kwt+1 denote respectively the money balances
and the capital stock held by the representative worker at the end of period
t, δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate of capital, rt the nominal interest rate,
wt the nominal wage, and pt the price of the final good. At each period, a
worker faces the two following constraints:
ptcwt (1+τ c (ct))+pt
¡
kwt+1 − (1− δ)kwt
¢
+mwt+1 = mwt +rtkwt +(1−τ l(ωtlt))wtlt
(8)
ptcwt (1 + τ c (ct)) + pt
¡
kwt+1 − (1− δ)kwt
¢
≤ mwt + rtkwt (9)
where (8) represents the budget constraint and (9) the liquidity constraint.
The representative worker maximizes his utility function (7) under the con-
straints (8) and (9). Workers know the policy rule followed by the govern-
ment. However, since there is a continuum of agents, each worker, being
atomistic, does not take into account the influence of its actions on aggre-
gate variables. This means that workers take Gt, τ c (ct) and τ l (ωtlt) as given
when solving their maximization problem. The equilibria considered here are
such that:
GηtU 0
µ
Gηt cwt
B
¶
> λGηt+1U 0
µ
Gηt+1cwt+1
B
¶
[(1− δ) + rt+1/pt+1] (10)
(1− δ)pt+1 + rt+1 > pt (11)
Then, workers always choose to not hold capital and the finance constraint
is binding. Therefore, we obtain the following equations:
u
µGηt+1cwt+1
B
¶
= v(lt) (12)
mwt+1 = (1− τ l(ωtlt))wtlt (13)
ptcwt (1 + τ c (ct)) = mwt (14)
8Ni (1995) provides empirical support for Edgeworth complementarity between private
and public consumption.
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where u(x) = xU 0(x) and v(l) = lV 0(l). We can further notice that under
Assumption 1, there exists a function γ ≡ u−1 ◦v, called the oﬀer curve, such
that Gηt+1cwt+1/B = γ(lt) and εγ(l) ≡ γ0(l)l/γ(l) ≥ 1, i.e. consumption and
labor are gross substitutes.9
2.4 Capitalists
Capitalists behave like a representative agent who maximizes his lifetime
utility function:
∞X
t=1
βt ln cct (15)
where β ∈ (λ, 1) is his discount factor and cct his consumption.10 At period
t, the representative agent faces the following budget constraint:
ptcct(1 + τ c (ct)) + pt
¡
kct+1 − (1− δ)kct
¢
+mct+1 = mct + rtkct (16)
where mct+1 and kct+1 are respectively the money balances and the capital
stock held at the end of period t by capitalists. Since we focus on equilibria
satisfying (11), capitalists do not hold money (mct = 0) because it has a lower
return than capital. We obtain then, the following optimal solution:
cct =
(1− β)Rtkt
1 + τ c (ct)
(17)
kt+1 = βRtkt (18)
where Rt ≡ 1− δ + rt/pt is the real gross return on capital.11
2.5 Equilibrium
Equilibrium on labor and capital markets requires ωt = wt/pt, ρt = rt/pt.
Considering that m > 0 is the constant money supply, and using (13) and
9Gross substitutability means that consumption is increasing in labor along the oﬀer
curve, i.e. V
0(l)+lV 00(l)
[U 0(x)+xU00(x)]Gη/B > 0. In our case this is verified since V (l) is increasing and
convex, and the degree of concavity of U(x) belongs to (0, 1).
10We do not introduce public expenditure externalities into capitalists’ preferences be-
cause, since they have a log-linear utility function, such externalities would not aﬀect the
dynamics.
11The superscript on kct is dropped because as we have seen before, workers do not hold
capital.
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(14), equilibrium in the money market at each period implies the following:
m/pt = (1 + τ c (ct))cwt = (1− τ l(ωtlt))ωtlt (19)
Therefore, in equilibrium, from (12) and (18) we obtain:
ωt+1lt+1ϕ(kt+1, lt+1)/B = γ (lt) (20)
kt+1 = β [ρt + 1− δ] kt (21)
with
ϕ(kt+1, lt+1) = Gηt+1
1− τ l(ωt+1lt+1)
1 + τ c (ct+1)
(22)
where ωt and ρt satisfy respectively (2) and (3), Gt, τ l(ωtlt) and τ c (ct) are
given respectively by (4), (5) and (6), and ct = cwt + cct , where cwt and cct
satisfy respectively (19) and (17).
Equations (20) and (21) determine the dynamics of this economy through
a two-dimensional dynamic system with one predetermined variable, the cap-
ital stock kt. Indeed, the perfect foresight intertemporal equilibrium of this
economy is a sequence (kt, lt) ∈ R++ × (0, l˜), t = 1, 2, ....∞ that, for a given
k1 > 0, solves the two-dimensional dynamic system (20) and (21). Note
that while kt is a variable determined by past actions, the value of lt, on the
contrary, is aﬀected by expectations of future events.
The function ϕ(kt, lt) denotes the distortion introduced by government
intervention in this economy. Remark that the distortion function ϕ can
be decomposed in two factors. The distortion due to government spending
externalities is given by Gηt , while (1 − τ l(ωtlt))/(1 + τ c (ct)) represents the
gap between real wages relevant to consumers and producers, due to taxation
(the tax wedge). For further reference we define εϕz(k, l) ≡ ∂ϕ(k,l)∂z
z
ϕ(k,l) ∈ R,
with z ∈ {k, l}.
Finally, note that in the absence of government intervention, i.e. when
ϕ(kt, lt) = 1, so that εϕl(k, l) = εϕk(k, l) = 0 for any (k, l) ∈ R++ × (0, l˜),
(20) and (21) describe the dynamics of the standard Woodford (1986) model
studied in Grandmont et al. (1998).
2.6 Steady State Analysis
In this section, we establish conditions for the existence of a unique steady
state (k, l) of the dynamic system (20) and (21).
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Proposition 1 Existence and uniqueness of the steady state:
Defining H(l) ≡ lϕ(a∗l, l)/γ(l), a∗ = (sβ/θ)1/(1−s) and θ ≡ 1−β(1− δ) ∈
(0, 1), and assuming that (1 − s)(a∗)smin{liml→0H(l), liml→elH(l)} < B <
(1−s)(a∗)smax{liml→0H(l), liml→elH(l)}, the dynamic system (20)-(21) has
a unique steady state (k, l) if one of the two following conditions is satisfied:
1. Either 1 + εϕk(a∗l, l) + εϕl(a∗l, l) > εγ(l) for l ∈ (0, l˜)
2. or 1 + εϕk(a∗l, l) + εϕl(a∗l, l) < εγ(l) for l ∈ (0, l˜)
Proof. See the Appendix.
3 Indeterminacy
Assuming that Proposition 1 is verified, we now study the local indeterminacy
of the steady state. We summarize our results in Proposition 2 below, where
εγ ≥ 1, εϕk and εϕl denote respectively the elasticities εγ(l), εϕk(k, l) and
εϕl(k, l) evaluated at the steady state.
Proposition 2 Indeterminacy
The steady state will be indeterminate if and only if:
(i) either εϕl > max
©
εTϕl, εHϕl, εFϕl
ª
;
(ii) or εϕl < min
©
s− 1, εTϕl, εFϕl
ª
;
where:
εTϕl = −εϕk + (εγ − 1)
εHϕl = [s− θ(1− s)] + [1− θ(1− s)] (εγ − 1)
εFϕl = −
[4−2s−θ(1−s)(2+εϕk)]
2−θ(1−s) − (εγ − 1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that, in this framework, it is not the level of the distortion introduced
by government intervention per se that is responsible for the emergence of
indeterminacy, but its variability (εϕk 6= 0, εϕl 6= 0). Indeed when εϕk =
εϕl = 0, the case studied in Grandmont et al. (1998), we can see from
Proposition 2 that the steady state can never be indeterminate. For instance,
when εϕk = 0, from (i) of Proposition 2 we have that εϕl > (εγ − 1) ≥ 0
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is a necessary condition for indeterminacy, and from (ii) it is necessary that
εϕl < s− 1 < 0 for indeterminacy to emerge. Moreover, when θ is small, i.e.
θ(1− s) < s as usually assumed in the Woodford (1986) framework,12 εHϕl is
positive, so that condition (i) requires a positive value for εϕl bounded away
from zero. Since from condition (ii) εϕl must take a negative value bounded
away from zero (εϕl < s − 1 < 0) we conclude that indeterminacy is not
possible for arbitrarily small values of εϕk and εϕl when θ is small.
For future reference let us define
ϕ ≡ εϕk + εϕl (23)
As we shall see, for the class of policy rules here considered, the parameter
ϕ summarizes the influence of the policy rule on the distortion variability.
3.1 Indeterminacy with Labor Taxation
In this section we discuss in detail the case where only labor taxation is used
to finance public spending, i.e. where αc = 0 so that τ c (ct) = 0, (see (6)).
In this case (4) and (22) become
Gt+1 = τ l (ωt+1lt+1)ωt+1lt+1 (24)
ϕ(kt+1, lt+1) = Gηt+1(1− τ l (ωt+1lt+1)) (25)
where τ l (ωl) satisfies (5). Therefore we obtain
εϕl =
·
η(1 + φl)− φl
αl
1− αl
¸
(1− s) (26)
εϕk =
·
η(1 + φl)− φl
αl
1− αl
¸
s (27)
so that ϕ (see (23)) is given by:13
ϕ =
·
η(1 + φl)− φl
αl
1− αl
¸
(28)
12Note that this assumption is frequently used in the literature (see Cazzavillan et
al. (1998)) and covers most commonly used parameterizations for the Woodford model.
Indeed most monthly parameterizations set θ close to 0.0123.
13Note that here ϕ represents also the elasticity of the function ϕ with respect to the
tax base (the wage bill), evaluated at the steady state.
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From Proposition 2 and (26)-(27), we can see that government policy influ-
ences the occurrence of indeterminacy through the parameters η, φl and αl:
η(1 + φl) is associated with the variability of the public spending externality
on preferences,14 while φl αl1−αl is associated with the variability of the tax
wedge. These parameters only influence εϕl and εϕk through a single factor
ϕ. Hence ϕ summarizes the variability of the distortion introduced by fiscal
policy.
Using Proposition 2, we now derive the indeterminacy conditions corre-
sponding to the labor taxation case. In order to make the analysis compa-
rable to the existing literature we set γ = 1.15 We summarize our results in
Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3 Indeterminacy under labor taxation and public ex-
penditures externalities:
Assuming that θ(1 − s) < s and γ = 1, the steady state will be indeter-
minate if and only if ϕ > [s−θ(1−s)](1−s) or ϕ <
−2[2−s−θ(1−s)]
(2−θ)(1−s) , i.e. iﬀ:
(i) for αl < η/(1 + η) either φl > φHl or φl < φFl
(ii) for αl > η/(1 + η) either φl < φHl or φl > φFl
where:
φHl =
(1− αl) [s− θ(1− s)− η(1− s)]
(1− s) [η − αl(1 + η)]
φFl =
−(1− αl) {2 [2− s− θ(1− s)] + η(1− s)(2− θ)}
(1− s)(2− θ) [η − αl(1 + η)]
Proof. See the Appendix.
From Proposition 3 we can see that indeterminacy is more likely the
higher the (absolute) value of ϕ, i.e. the stronger the variability of the
distortion.
3.1.1 Economic Intuition
In our framework the variability of the distortion introduced by government
intervention is the mechanism responsible for indeterminacy, which emerges
14When φl = −1 the variability of the public spending externality disappears, because
this corresponds to the case where G is constant.
15Note that this corresponds to the case of an infinitely elastic labor supply curve.
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if this variability is suﬃciently strong. Indeed, as discussed before, when
εϕl = εϕk = 0, so that ϕ = 0, we recover the case considered in Grandmont
et al. (1998), where the steady state is never indeterminate in the Cobb-
Douglas case. In order to understand why, consider the following intuitive
argument that, since local indeterminacy means that local equilibrium trajec-
tories converge to the steady state, is based on the existence of a mechanism
able to bring back to the steady state any deviating trajectory. Consider for
instance that in period t, starting from the steady state, there is an instan-
taneous increase in the capital stock kt. This implies an increase in kt+1 (see
(21)), and therefore in the future wage bill. In the absence of public spending
financed by labor taxation this increase in the future wage bill must be sus-
tained by an increase in current employment, see (20), which in turn implies
an increase in the current interest rate (see (3)), that reinforces the initial
increase in kt+1. This in turn implies a decrease in the rental rate of capital at
t+ 1. In order to obtain a reversal in the trajectory a suﬃciently important
decrease in the rental rate of capital at t+1 should be observed, so that kt+2
decreases. However, in the Cobb-Douglas case this can never happen so that
indeterminacy never emerges.
Consider now the case where ϕ > 0, i.e. where we have tax rates that
respond negatively to the tax base (φ < 0) and/or public spending external-
ities (η > 0). See equation (28). Now, the increase in future capital implies
an increase in the future wage and in the distortion function ϕ(kt+1, lt+1)
that, as before, must be sustained by an increase in current labor (see (20)).
This last eﬀect triggers all the events described above, implying a decrease
in the rental rate of capital at t + 1. However now, if ϕ is suﬃciently big,
the observed increase in current employment is consistent with a decrease
in future labor lt+1 (see (20)). This implies a suﬃciently fall in rt+1, that
reverses the trajectory of capital.
Assume now that ϕ < 0, i.e. taxes vary positively with the tax base
(φ > 0). Then, if ϕ is suﬃciently big in absolute value, the increase in the
future wage bill may, in contrast to what happened in the two previous cases,
lead to a decrease in current employment. See equation (20). This last eﬀect
has a negative impact on the current interest rate (see (3)), which reduces
kt+1 restoring the path to equilibrium.
We can therefore understand why the emergence of indeterminacy re-
quires suﬃciently high (in absolute terms) values for ϕ , i.e. a suﬃciently
elastic response of the function ϕ with respect to capital and labor.
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3.1.2 Discussion of the Results
In this section we discuss and compare our indeterminacy results with pre-
vious papers that have addressed related issues. To ease the discussion we
have plotted, in figures 1 and 2, φHl and φFl as functions of 0 < αl < 1, for
diﬀerent values of η ≥ 0, assuming that θ(1 − s) < s. The indeterminacy
region is the shaded area.
(insert figure 1 here)
The case of η = 0, where public spending does not aﬀect workers’ util-
ity, falls into case (ii) of Proposition 3 and is depicted in the right-hand
side (RHS) of figure 1 where αl is always greater than η/(1 + η) = 0. We
can see that, in this case, indeterminacy is not possible with a constant
tax rate (φl = 0).16 The same result was obtained in a Ramsey model by
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) and Guo and Harrison (2004). However, for
any given level of αl, a suﬃciently (positively or negatively) elastic tax rule
implies the existence of indeterminacy. In this respect we diﬀer from Guo
and Lansing (1998) and Dromel and Pintus (2004), that find, respectively
in the Benhabib and Farmer (1994) framework and in a Woodford model
without government spending externalities, that determinacy is more likely
when the tax schedule becomes more progressive. Note, however, that both
Guo and Lansing (1998) and Dromel and Pintus (2004) consider that agents
take into account how the tax rate aﬀects their earnings. Therefore, they
have to exclude parameter configurations where after tax income decreases
with income. With our notation, this means that they do not consider the
cases where ϕ < −1, i.e. φl > (1 − αl)/αl. On the contrary, in our case,
since agents take the tax rate as given, these parameter configurations are
possible, and indeterminacy occurs for φl > φFl > (1− αl)/αl.
From the RHS of figure 1 we can also see that, when η = 0, for a given
level of φl 6= 0, indeterminacy requires a suﬃciently high level of αl. In
particular, when a constant level of G is assumed (φl = −1), local indeter-
minacy emerges when αl > α∗l = [s− θ(1− s)] / [1− θ(1− s)]. This result is
in accordance with previous works considering labor taxation and no public
expenditures externalities. See for instance Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997),
Pintus (2003) and Gokan (2006) who assume a constant level of G and all
16Note that, when η = 0, in the case of a constant tax rate we have εϕl = εϕk = 0 (see
(26) to (28)), so that, as shown before, indeterminacy is not possible.
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find that indeterminacy requires a lower bound for the tax rate. Note also
that when φl = −1, we obtain this same indeterminacy condition on αl for
any value of η ≥ 0, because the eﬀect of the public spending externality dis-
appears when G is constant. Guo and Harrison (2006) also find that, in the
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) framework (φl = −1), government spending
externalities do not aﬀect indeterminacy conditions.
We can therefore conclude that for a given value of φl, a suﬃciently low
level of the tax rate stabilizes economic fluctuations, whereas for a given level
of the tax rate, αl, tax schedules suﬃciently elastic destabilize the economy.
This means that there is a trade-oﬀ between the values of these two para-
meters, φl, the tax response to the business cycle and αl, the level of tax
rate, needed for determinacy: the higher the elasticity of the tax schedule,
the lower the tax rate needed to ensure determinacy of the steady state.
When η > 0 two diﬀerent configurations are possible depending on whether
η ≷ η∗ ≡ [s− θ(1− s)] /(1 − s). In figure 1 we represent the case where
η < η∗.We can see that, in this case, indeterminacy is still not possible with
a constant tax rate (φl = 0). However, for low values of αl (αl < η/(1 + η)),
a new type of configuration, that reverses the trade-oﬀ between αl and φl
needed for determinacy, is obtained: the higher φl (in absolute value), the
higher the value of αl required for determinacy.
(insert figure 2 here)
Finally the case of higher public spending externalities, η > η∗, is repre-
sented in figure 2. We can see that, in this case, indeterminacy prevails for
φl ≥ 0 and αl < η/(1 + η), and for φl ≤ 0 and αl > η/(1 + η). In particular,
and in contrast to what happened in the other two previous cases, indetermi-
nacy is now always obtained with a constant tax rate (φl = 0). Indeed, using
Proposition 3, we can easily prove that, when φl = 0, indeterminacy requires
a minimum degree for public spending externalities in preferences, precisely
η > η∗. Cazzavillan (1996) and Guo and Harrison (2006), in optimal growth
models with public spending externalities on preferences and a constant tax
rate, also find that a minimum bound for the elasticity of the public spend-
ing externalities is required for indeterminacy to emerge. For related findings
in overlapping generations models, see Seegmuller (2003) and Utaka (2003).
These results suggest that public expenditures externalities on preferences
constitute an important channel for the emergence of indeterminacy.
The results here obtained show that fiscal policy rules may be responsible
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for indeterminacy, and thereby their design should take into account their
possible destabilizing eﬀects through this channel. This is an issue already
emphasized in several other works, but our results further show that the way
φl and αl interact in order to create local indeterminacy strongly depends on
the presence and strength of public spending externalities.
Finally, since indeterminacy is linked to expectations driven fluctuations,
a relevant issue is to understand whether such fluctuations are costly from a
welfare point of view. We know that in a constant returns to scale economy
without externalities and/or government intervention, the concavity of util-
ity makes volatile paths welfare inferior to stationary allocations (concavity
eﬀect). However, in the presence of productive externalities that imply in-
creasing returns at the social level, Christiano and Harrison (1999) show that
despite concavity in the utility function, increasing volatility may raise wel-
fare for the representative agent. In their set-up, this happens because with
increasing returns, "by bunching hard work, consumption can be increased on
average without raising the average level of employment (bunching eﬀect)."
Then, if this last eﬀect dominates, fluctuations can be welfare improving. In
our set-up, things are more complicated because we have two types of agents.
In the case of capitalists, only the concavity eﬀect applies so that fluctua-
tions are welfare decreasing. However, in the case of workers, a bunching
eﬀect can occur. In fact, if eﬀective consumption (Gηt cwt ) is convex in the tax
base (i.e. in production)17 by bunching labor (capital) eﬀective consumption
can be increased on average without raising the average level of employment
(capital). Since worker preferences are concave in eﬀective consumption and
leisure, if eﬀective consumption is suﬃciently convex with respect to labor
income, the bunching eﬀect dominates so that fluctuations can be welfare im-
proving for workers. For example, in the limit case of γ = 1, this happens for
η > 0 suﬃciently high. However, since for capitalists fluctuations are always
welfare costly, even if the worker bunching eﬀect dominates, we cannot claim
that fluctuations are welfare improving. On the contrary, if for workers the
bunching eﬀect is dominated by the concavity eﬀect, fluctuations are welfare
costly. In this last case, a fiscal policy that promotes indeterminacy should
be avoided.
17Using (19) and (24), we can see that eﬀective consumption is a function of ωtlt.
Moreover, production linearly depends on labor income (yt = ωtlt/(1− s)).
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3.1.3 A Numerical Illustration
In order to further highlight the role of public spending externalities on the
emergence of indeterminacy, we provide below a numerical exercise intended
to assess the empirical plausibility of our analysis. We set θ = 0.0123, which
corresponds to a monthly depreciation rate (δ) of 0.0083 and to a monthly
β = 0.9956. For the capital income share we use s = 0.4. See Cooley and
Prescott (1995). In what concerns the labor income tax rate, Mendoza et
al. (1994) provide estimates that range from 0.23 to 0.285 for the United
States and from 0.27 to 0.47 for a group of six other countries (UK, France,
Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan). We will therefore consider two values
for αl, respectively 0.24 and 0.43, to represent the two polar cases of the
United States versus Europe. As values for φl and η are more diﬃcult to
pin-down we choose to consider an open interval for these two elasticities.
For φl we will concentrate on values in the interval (−2, 2) that covers most
of the existing situations, in particular the benchmark cases of a constant
tax rate (φl = 0) and of constant government expenditures (φl = −1). In
the case of η we will consider an interval consistent with the empirical values
provided by Ni (1995). In his empirical study Ni (1995) validates a utility
function of the non-separable Cobb-Douglas form U (ct, Gt) = U
¡
cθ1t Gθ2t
¢
with θ1, θ2 > 0, that is equivalent to our formulation (see (7)) for η = θ2/θ1.
Imposing θ1 + θ2 = 1 he obtains values for θ1 between 0.64 and 0.75, which
imply values for η between 0.33 and 0.56. Note, however, that the condition
θ1 + θ2 = 1 he imposes may restrict significantly his empirical estimates.
Nevertheless his results suggest that public expenditures are non-separable
and complements to private consumption, and that the relative weight of
private consumption in eﬀective consumption is most probably higher than
the one of government expenditures (θ1 > θ2). Therefore, in our numerical
exercise, we will concentrate on values for η between 0 and 1.18
We start now analyzing the case where αl = 0.24, that corresponds to
the case of the United States economy. In this case indeterminacy only
18Since we are considering fixed values for αl we have to rewrite our indeterminacy
conditions accordingly. Using Proposition 3 we can state that, for a fixed value of 0 <
αl < 1, indeterminacy emerges for φl < −1 iﬀ η < ηH or η > ηF , whereas for φl > −1
we have indeterminacy iﬀ η > ηH or η < ηF , where ηH = [s−θ(1−s)](1−αl)+φlαl(1−s)(1−s)(1−αl)(1+φl) and
ηF = −2[2−s−θ(1−s)](1−αl)+φlαl(1−s)(2−θ)(2−θ)(1−s)(1−αl)(1+φl) . For φl = −1, as we have seen, since G is constant
the eﬀect of public spending externalities disappears, and indeterminacy simply requires
αl > α∗l (= 0.396 with our parameterization).
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emerges for suﬃciently high values of η and φl. Indeed, for any η ∈ [0, 1],
indeterminacy does not appear when −2 < φl ≤ −0.5.19 For −0.5 < φl < 2,
indeterminacy requires a lower bound for η decreasing in φl. For example
when φl = 0, the case of a constant tax rate, indeterminacy requires η >
η∗ = 0.654, whereas the lower limit for η compatible with indeterminacy is
0.485 for φl = 1 and 0.428 for φl = 2.
We now consider the case where αl = 0.43, that corresponds to the case of
the European economy. Indeterminacy is now possible for any φl between −2
and 2, becoming more likely as φl approaches −1. Indeed, for −1.4 < φl ≤
−0.87 and all η between 0 and 1, indeterminacy is a pervasive phenomenon.20
For −2 < φl < −1.4 indeterminacy requires an upper bound for η, increasing
with φl while for −0.87 < φl < 2, indeterminacy only emerges above a lower
bound for η also increasing with φl. Indeed, the lower limit for η compatible
with indeterminacy is 0 for φl = −0.87, reaching 0.72 for φl = 2. As in the
previous case, this lower limit is η∗ = 0.654 when φl = 0.
From this numerical exercise a few interesting conclusions emerge. In
countries, like the United States, where the average labor income tax rate
is suﬃciently small (below α∗l ), a tax rate schedule with an elasticity below
or identical to -0.5 is capable of insulating the economy from belief driven
fluctuations, for any value of η empirically relevant. In contrast, when the
tax-schedule elasticity is above -0.5 the likelihood of sunspots fluctuations,
for empirically relevant values of public spending externalities, is increasing
with φl, so that, in order to eradicate belief driven fluctuations, tax rate
elasticities should be suﬃciently low. For example, if η = 0.5 a φl below
0.8 is necessary to avoid sunspots, whereas for η = η∗ = 0.654 the tax
rate elasticity is required to be negative. On the contrary, in countries, like
France, Germany or Italy, with a high labor income tax rate (above α∗l ), a tax
rate schedule with an elasticity below or identical to −0.87, leads to sunspots
fluctuations for most empirically relevant values for η.Moreover, in these high
labor income tax rate countries, when φl > −0.87 the likelihood of sunspot
fluctuations, for empirically relevant values of public spending externalities,
is decreasing with φl. Therefore in order to insulate the economy from belief
driven fluctuations a suﬃciently high φl is required. For example if η = 0.5
a φl above -0,6 is necessary to avoid sunspots, whereas if η = η∗ = 0.654 a
19Note that, since in this case we have αl < α∗l = 0.396, indeterminacy never emerges
in the case of constant public expenditures (φl = −1).
20Note that in this case, as αl > α∗l = 0.396, indeterminacy always emerges with
constant public expenditures (φl = −1).
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positive tax rate elasticity is required.
From this numerical exercise we can confirm that public spending exter-
nalities, compatible with empirical estimates, matter for the emergence of
indeterminacy and sunspots. Indeed, they aﬀect significantly the combina-
tions of φl and αl capable of generating sunspot fluctuations, and therefore
the eﬀects of the policy rule.
3.2 Indeterminacy with Consumption Taxes
We consider now that the government only uses consumption taxes, i.e. that
αl = 0 so that τ l (ωtlt) = 0 (see (5)). To simplify the analysis, we ignore
public spending externalities in preferences, i.e. η = 0, so that (22) becomes:
ϕ(kt+1, lt+1) =
1
1 + τ c (ct+1)
(29)
where τ c (ct) is given by (6), and using (2), (3), (17) and (19) ct satisfies the
following equation:
(1 + τ c(ct))ct = ωtlt + (1− β)Rtkt
= kt[(1− β)(1− δ) + (1− sβ)ks−1t l1−st ]
. (30)
Accordingly we have that
εϕl =
−αcφc
1 + αc(1 + φc)
·
(1− s)(1− βs)θ
(1− s)θ + (1− β)s
¸
(31)
εϕk =
−αcφc
1 + αc(1 + φc)
·
1− (1− s)(1− βs)θ
(1− s)θ + (1− β)s
¸
(32)
so that ϕ (see (23)) is given by:21
ϕ =
−αcφc
1 + αc(1 + φc)
(33)
As in the case of labor taxation ϕ summarizes the variability of the distortion
due to fiscal policy. Since η = 0, ϕ has only a term which represents the
variability of the tax wedge.
21Note that here ϕ represents also the elasticity of the function ϕ with respect to
income used for consumption expenditures, evaluated at the steady state. One can also
easily determine the elasticity of the distortion with respect to the tax base, which is equal
to −αcφc/(1 + αc).
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Using Proposition 2 we now derive the indeterminacy conditions corre-
sponding to the consumption taxation case that we summarize in Proposition
4 below. Again, in order to make the analysis comparable to the existing lit-
erature, we have set γ = 1.
Proposition 4 Indeterminacy under consumption taxation:
Assuming that θ(1 − s) < s and that γ = 1, the steady state is inde-
terminate if and only if ϕ > ν or ϕ < −ρ, i.e. iﬀ φFc < φc < φHc for
φc 6= −(1 + αc)/αc where:22
φHc = −
v
(1 + v)
(1 + αc)
αc
< 0
φFc = −
ρ
(ρ− 1)
(1 + αc)
αc
< 0
ν = [s− θ(1− s)] [(1− s)θ + (1− β)s]
(1− s)(1− βs)θ > 0
ρ = 2 [2− s− θ(1− s)] [(1− s)θ + (1− β)s]θ(1− s) [2− s− (1− s)θ − βs] > 1
Proof. See the Appendix.
From Proposition 4 we can immediately see that, as in the case of labor
taxation, indeterminacy requires a suﬃciently strong (in absolute value) vari-
ability of the function ϕ. Indeed, with both types of taxation the mechanisms
operating are the same, so that both the requirements and the intuition for
the emergence of indeterminacy are similar. Therefore, the economic intu-
ition provided in the previous section also applies in this case. There remains
however a diﬀerence worth emphasizing. In the case of labor taxation, and
ignoring for the sake of simplicity public spending externalities, positive (neg-
ative) values for ϕ are always associated with negative (positive) values for
φ, whereas in the case of consumption taxes this is no longer true. See equa-
tion (33).23 This explains why the indeterminacy results expressed in terms
22Note that for φc = −(1 + αc)/αc steady state consumption is not well defined (see
(30)).
23Indeed a positive ϕ implies that −(1 + αc)/αc < φc < 0, and a negative ϕ means
that either φc < −(1 + αc)/αc or φc > 0. However, when φc > 0, ϕ > −1, so that ϕ is
never below −ρ < −1. Therefore indeterminacy never emerges when φc > 0. See figure 3.
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of the tax rate and its variability are so diﬀerent in the cases of labor and
consumption taxes.
(insert figure 3 here)
In figure 3 we have represented the indeterminacy region (shaded area) in
the plane (αc, φc), by plotting the functions −1+αcαc , φ
F
c , and φHc as functions
of αc considering, as before, s > θ(1−s). We can see that indeterminacy with
consumption taxes is only possible for φc < 0, so that a consumption tax rate
that is increasing in the tax base implies local determinacy. Also, when the
tax rate is constant (φc = 0) the steady state is never locally indeterminate,
as in the case of labor taxation without government spending externalities.24
In the context of a Ramsey model, Giannitsarou (2007) found that inde-
terminacy is not possible when a fixed stream of government spending is
financed by consumption taxes. On the contrary, in our set up, indetermi-
nacy is possible when government spending is constant. Indeed, this case is
here recovered assuming that φc = −1, and, from figure 3, we can see that in
this case, and as in the case of labor taxation, indeterminacy emerges when
αc is suﬃciently high (αc > ν = 0.808 with our parameterization).
The sharp diﬀerence between our results and those of Giannitsarou (2007)
shows that the eﬀects of policy rules on indeterminacy crucially depend on
the financial market imperfections existing in the economy.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we studied the role of public spending externalities and vari-
able tax rates on local indeterminacy. As it is well-known, indeterminacy
of equilibria is associated with the occurrence of fluctuations driven by self
fulfilling prophecies (sunspots). Therefore, as it has already been stressed in
the literature, fiscal policy rules that promote indeterminacy may have desta-
bilizing eﬀects on the economy. In this paper we contribute to this debate by
showing that the destabilizing eﬀects of diﬀerent fiscal rules cannot be cor-
rectly assessed without taking into consideration the possible existence (and
degree) of public spending externalities and/or the existence of financial mar-
kets imperfections. Indeed we have shown that the same policy rule can have
24Indeed when φc = 0 we have that εϕl = εϕk = 0, so that indeterminacy does not
emerge.
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completely diﬀerent eﬀects on stability depending on the strength of public
spending externalities. Moreover, we have established that the presence of
imperfect financial markets can clearly reverse the (de)stabilizing outcomes
of some fiscal policy rules (see for instance our discussion on consumption
taxes).
Finally, it can be shown that a Woodford economy with government
spending financed by labor income and/or consumption taxation is isomor-
phic to an overlapping generations framework (without first period consump-
tion as developed in Reichlin (1986)) with government spending financed
by capital income and/or consumption taxes. Therefore, the indeterminacy
mechanisms operating are the same, coming in both cases from the variability
of the distortion introduced by government intervention. For a further dis-
cussion on this topic the reader is referred to a former version of this paper,
Lloyd-Braga, Modesto and Seegmuller (2006).25
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Studying the existence and uniqueness of the steady state (k, l) of the dy-
namic system (20) and (21) is equivalent to analyze the existence and unique-
ness of a stationary solution (a, l), with a ≡ k/l, of the two following equa-
tions:
sas−1 = θ/β (34)
(1− s)aslϕ(al, l)/B = γ(l) (35)
We can easily see that a∗ is the unique solution to equation (34). Since H(l)
is a continuous function, under the boundary assumptions on B stated in
Proposition 1, there exists a value l∗ solving (35) with a = a∗. Uniqueness of
l∗ is ensured by inequalities 1 or 2 in Proposition 1, because in these cases
H(l) is a monotonic function.
25This conclusion can be related to Dromel and Pintus (2004) who also remark that
capital taxation in OLG models and labor taxation in the Woodford framework have
similar eﬀects for the occurrence of indeterminacy.
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5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
To study the local indeterminacy of the steady state, assuming that Propo-
sition 1 is verified, we diﬀerentiate the two-dimensional dynamic system (20)
and (21) in the neighborhood of the steady state. The trace T and the
determinant D of the associated Jacobian matrix are given by:
T = 1 + εγ − θ(1− s)(1 + εϕl + εϕk)εϕl + 1− s
D = εγ [1− θ(1− s)]εϕl + 1− s
where εγ ≥ 1, εϕk and εϕl denote respectively the elasticities εγ(l), εϕk(k, l)
and εϕl(k, l) evaluated at the steady state. Since we only have one prede-
termined variable (capital) the steady-state is locally indeterminate when it
is a sink (both eigenvalues, i.e. both roots of the characteristic polynomial
P (λ) = λ2 − λT +D = 0, with modulus lower than one). Therefore indeter-
minacy requires that D < 1, 1− T +D > 0 and 1 + T +D > 0. When the
denominator of both the trace and the determinant is positive (εϕl > s− 1)
these conditions can be written respectively as εϕl > εHϕl, εϕl > εTϕl, and
εϕl > εFϕl where εHϕl, εTϕl and εFϕl are given in Proposition 2. When the de-
nominator of both the trace and the determinant is negative (εϕl < s − 1)
these conditions can be written respectively as εϕl < εHϕl, εϕl < εTϕl, and
εϕl < εFϕl. Combining these results, and noticing that εHϕl > s−1, Proposition
2 immediately follows.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We apply Proposition 2. Using expressions (26) to (28), it is easy to show
that, for γ = 1, conditions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2 can be written as
ϕ > max
n
0, [s−θ(1−s)]
(1−s) ,
−2[2−s−θ(1−s)]
(2−θ)(1−s)
o
and ϕ < min
n
−1, 0, −2[2−s−θ(1−s)]
(2−θ)(1−s)
o
.
Since, for θ(1 − s) < s, [s−θ(1−s)]
(1−s) = max
n
0, [s−θ(1−s)]
(1−s) ,
−2[2−s−θ(1−s)]
(2−θ)(1−s)
o
and
−2[2−s−θ(1−s)]
(2−θ)(1−s) = min
n
−1, 0, −2[2−s−θ(1−s)]
(2−θ)(1−s)
o
, these two conditions become re-
spectively ϕ > [s−θ(1−s)](1−s) and ϕ <
−2[2−s−θ(1−s)]
(2−θ)(1−s) . Then, using expression (28)
to substitute ϕ in these two last inequalities, it is straightforward to obtain
Proposition 3.
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5.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We apply Proposition 2. Using expressions (31) to (33), it is easy to show
that, for γ = 1, conditions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2 become respectively
ϕ > max {0, ν,−ρ} and ϕ < min
n
− [(1−s)θ+(1−β)s]
(1−βs)θ , 0,−ρ
o
. Since for θ(1−
s) < s ν = max {0, ν,−ρ} and -ρ = min
n
− [(1−s)θ+(1−β)s]
(1−βs)θ , 0,−ρ
o
, those
conditions become respectively ϕ > ν and ϕ < −ρ. Then, substituting
expression (33) in these last two inequalities, it is straightforward to obtain
Proposition 4.
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